LAW30405 / LAW30205 Introduction to Business Law Sample: ILAC Answer on Offer, Acceptance and Consideration
For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work.
This extract shows how the LAW30405 / LAW30205 Introduction to Business Law individual written assignment (August 2026 session) could be answered using the ILAC method. It is a model of structure and reasoning, not a finished answer. Your submission must be your own, within 1,350 to 1,650 words, and must follow your institution’s rules on similarity, AI use and the declaration form.
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Related: read the full LAW30405 / LAW30205 assignment question and our guide to the ILAC method for Malaysian contract law problem questions.
Part (a): Does Cathy have a contract with Rumi?
Issue
Whether a binding contract for the printing machine was formed between Rumi and Cathy, focusing on offer, counter-offer, acceptance and revocation under the Contracts Act 1950.
Law
| Rule | Authority |
|---|---|
| A proposal (offer) is a willingness to do or abstain from doing something, with a view to obtaining the other party’s assent | Contracts Act 1950, s 2(a) |
| An advertisement inviting interest is usually an invitation to treat, not an offer | Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204 |
| Acceptance must be absolute and unqualified | Contracts Act 1950, s 7(a) |
| A counter-offer rejects and ends the original offer | Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334 |
| A mere request for information is not a counter-offer | Stevenson, Jacques & Co v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346 |
| A proposal may be revoked before acceptance is complete, but revocation must be communicated | Contracts Act 1950, ss 4(3), 5(1) and 6(a); Byrne & Co v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344 |
| Acceptance by instantaneous communication takes effect when it reaches the offeror | Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327 |
Application
Rumi’s WhatsApp post asked interested parties to contact her. It is best treated as an invitation to treat, following Partridge v Crittenden, because it invited negotiation rather than showing a willingness to be bound with whoever replied first.
Cathy’s RM7,000 message was therefore an offer, which Rumi rejected. Rumi’s statement that she would accept RM7,800 can be treated as a new proposal under s 2(a), since it states a clear price at which she was willing to sell.
The key question is Cathy’s message asking whether Rumi would accept RM7,500 if Cathy collected the machine. If this was a counter-offer, it ended Rumi’s RM7,800 proposal under Hyde v Wrench, and Cathy’s later attempt to accept would itself be only a fresh offer. If it was a request for information, as in Stevenson v McLean, Rumi’s proposal remained open. The wording, framed as a question, supports the second reading, although a court could see it as an attempt to vary the price.
Rumi agreed to sell to Melo on Wednesday, but nothing suggests she told Cathy. Under ss 4(3), 5(1) and 6(a), revocation must be communicated, and Byrne v Van Tienhoven confirms that an uncommunicated revocation has no effect. Cathy’s acceptance on Thursday, sent by WhatsApp and backed by a RM1,000 transfer, was communicated before any revocation reached her.
Conclusion
If Cathy’s RM7,500 message is treated as an enquiry, a binding contract was formed on Thursday at RM7,800. Because the machine has gone to Melo, Cathy’s practical remedy would be damages for breach and the return of her RM1,000. If the message is treated as a counter-offer, no contract exists and Cathy can only recover the RM1,000.
Part (b): Does Kero have a contract with Rumi?
Issue
Whether Rumi’s later promise to pay RM5,000 for a logo that Kero designed without being asked is supported by consideration.
Law
Under s 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950, consideration exists when, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee has done or abstained from doing something. The Malaysian provision allows past consideration, provided the act was done at the promisor’s desire (Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170). Section 26(b) adds an exception: an agreement without consideration is not void if it is a promise to compensate a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor.
Application
Rumi’s remark that she hoped Kero might one day help with her logo reads as a hope, not a request, so it is doubtful that Kero acted “at the desire of the promisor” under s 2(d). On that basis, Kero’s work would not count as consideration.
However, s 26(b) may still assist Kero. He voluntarily did something for Rumi, and after seeing the design she promised to pay RM5,000. That promise to compensate for a voluntary act falls within the wording of s 26(b), which does not require the promise to be in writing.
Conclusion
Kero would likely struggle to show consideration under s 2(d), but he has a reasonable argument that Rumi’s promise is enforceable under s 26(b). Rumi’s argument that payment was never discussed beforehand is therefore not decisive.
How the marks are earned
| Criterion | Weight | What this extract shows |
|---|---|---|
| Knowledge and understanding | 15% | Statute plus cases for each rule, across more than four source types in the full answer |
| Adaptation and application of law | 15% | Each rule tied to a specific fact, with alternative readings where facts are ambiguous |
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References
Byrne & Co v Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 CPD 344.
Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136). Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad.
Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 QB 327.
Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334.
Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt [1968] 1 MLJ 170.
Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204.
Stevenson, Jacques & Co v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346.
