LAW30405 / LAW30205 Introduction to Business Law Assignment Sample (ILAC, August 2026)

For information and reference only – not to be submitted as your own work. This is a model-answer extract written by our law specialist to show how an ILAC answer can be structured. Use it to understand the reasoning, then write your own answer in your own words. Submitting this text, in whole or in part, would breach your institution’s academic integrity rules and the declaration you sign with the assessment. This sample is an academic illustration. It is not legal advice and should not be relied on for any real dispute.

What this sample covers

The LAW30405 / LAW30205 Introduction to Business Law individual written assignment (August 2026) is worth 30% of the module. Students advise two parties in a short scenario using the ILAC method, supported by Malaysian statute and case law, in about 1,500 words (plus or minus 10%) with Harvard referencing.

Part (a) asks whether a contract was formed through offer and acceptance. Part (b) asks whether a promise to pay is supported by consideration. You can read the full brief on our LAW30405 Introduction to Business Law assignment question page.

For the step-by-step method behind this answer, read our guide on how to use the ILAC method for a business law problem question.

Model answer extract – Part (a): advising Cathy on offer and acceptance

Issue

The issue is whether a binding contract for the sale of the printing machine was formed between Rumi and Cathy, and in particular whether Cathy’s Thursday message, sent with a part payment of RM1,000, was a valid acceptance of a proposal that was still open.

Law

Under section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950, an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. An agreement starts with a proposal. Section 2(a) provides that a person makes a proposal when he signifies to another his willingness to do or abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining that person’s assent. Under section 2(b), the proposal is accepted when the person to whom it is made signifies his assent (Contracts Act 1950).

A proposal must be distinguished from an invitation to treat, which only invites others to make offers. In Harvey v Facey [1893] AC 552, a reply stating the lowest acceptable price was held to be information, not an offer. Advertisements are usually invitations to treat: Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204.

Section 7(a) requires acceptance to be absolute and unqualified. A reply that changes the terms is a counter-proposal, which rejects and destroys the original proposal: Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334. A mere request for information, however, does not destroy the offer: Stevenson, Jacques & Co v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346. Silence by the offeree does not amount to acceptance: Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CB (NS) 869.

A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer (section 5(1)). Under section 4(3), however, revocation is complete as against the person to whom it is made only when it comes to his knowledge (Lee and Detta, 2009).

Application

Rumi’s WhatsApp message to a group of business owners invited “anyone interested” to contact her. It named a price but showed no intention to be bound by the first reply. Like the advertisement in Partridge v Crittenden, it is best treated as an invitation to treat. The Friday deadline therefore did not create a proposal that Cathy could accept.

Cathy’s private message offering RM7,000 was the first proposal under section 2(a). Rumi rejected it and stated, “I could let it go for RM7,800.” Unlike the bare price information in Harvey v Facey, this was given in direct reply to a buyer’s offer and indicated the price at which Rumi was willing to sell. It is arguably a counter-proposal capable of acceptance.

The decisive fact is Cathy’s reply: “Would you consider RM7,500 if I collect it myself?” Cathy may argue that this was only an enquiry, as in Stevenson v McLean, leaving the RM7,800 proposal open. The stronger view is that it introduced a lower price and a new term about collection. It was not an absolute and unqualified acceptance under section 7(a). Following Hyde v Wrench, it operated as a counter-proposal that rejected the RM7,800 figure.

Rumi read the message and did not respond. Following Felthouse v Bindley, her silence did not accept the RM7,500 counter-proposal. Cathy’s Thursday message agreeing to pay RM7,800 was therefore a fresh proposal, not an acceptance. The RM1,000 transfer cannot convert a proposal into a contract, because Rumi never signified assent under section 2(b).

If a court preferred Cathy’s “mere enquiry” argument, the result could change. Rumi’s sale to Melo on Wednesday was never communicated to Cathy, so under section 4(3) the RM7,800 proposal would not have been revoked as against Cathy. Her Thursday acceptance could then complete a contract, and Rumi would be in breach. Because the machine has been sold to Melo, Cathy’s realistic remedy would be damages rather than the machine itself.

Conclusion

Cathy is unlikely to have a binding contract with Rumi. Her RM7,500 message most probably operated as a counter-proposal that ended the RM7,800 proposal, and Rumi’s silence was not acceptance. Cathy should be advised to request the return of her RM1,000 part payment. Her best argument, which is weaker, is that her message was only a request for information.

Stuck on your own ILAC answer? A law specialist can walk you through issue spotting, case selection and Harvard referencing for LAW30405 before your submission date. Get expert guidance now.

Model answer extract – Part (b): advising Kero on consideration

Issue

The issue is whether Rumi’s promise to pay Kero RM5,000, made after Kero had already designed the logo, is enforceable when no payment was discussed before the work was done.

Law

Section 10(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of competent parties, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object. Section 2(d) defines consideration: when, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or promises to do, something, that act or promise is consideration.

The words “has done” mean that past consideration can be valid in Malaysia, unlike the strict English rule in Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669. The Privy Council considered section 2(d) in Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt [1968] 2 WLR 55. The act must, however, be done at the desire of the promisor. In Durga Prasad v Baldeo (1880) ILR 3 All 221, an act done at the request of a third party was not consideration for the defendant’s promise.

Section 26 states that an agreement made without consideration is void, subject to exceptions. Under section 26(b), a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor is enforceable. Illustration (c) to section 26 describes a finder who returns a purse and is then promised a reward; this is a contract.

In commercial dealings, there is a strong presumption that the parties intend legal relations: Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349.

Application

Rumi only said she “hopes Kero might one day help” recreate her logo. This was a general hope, not a request. Kero then designed the logo without further discussion. His work was therefore not done “at the desire of the promisor” under section 2(d), and, as in Durga Prasad v Baldeo, it cannot be consideration on that basis.

That is not the end of the matter. Kero voluntarily did something for Rumi: he produced a logo for her business. After seeing it, Rumi promised to pay RM5,000. This fits section 26(b) closely, because it is a promise to compensate a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor. The purse illustration is a close parallel: the service came first and the promise to reward followed.

Rumi’s argument that no payment was discussed beforehand reflects the English past consideration rule. Section 26(b) displaces that rule in Malaysia. The promise was made in a business context about a business logo, so the presumption in Edwards v Skyways supports an intention to create legal relations.

Conclusion

Kero is likely to have an enforceable agreement with Rumi. Although his work was not consideration under section 2(d), Rumi’s later promise falls within section 26(b). Kero should be advised that he can claim the RM5,000, starting with a written demand before considering a claim in court.

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About the expert

John Collins is a law assignment expert at Malaysia Assignment Help. His profile lists a Master’s in Law from the University of Malaya, 10 years in the field (8 with Malaysia Assignment Help), 2,966 completed orders, and strengths in criminal law, corporate law, media law and international law.

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References

Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136). Laws of Malaysia. Putrajaya: Attorney General’s Chambers of Malaysia.

Durga Prasad v Baldeo (1880) ILR 3 All 221.

Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349.

Felthouse v Bindley (1862) 11 CB (NS) 869.

Harvey v Facey [1893] AC 552.

Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav 334.

Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt [1968] 2 WLR 55.

Lee, M.P. and Detta, I.J. (2009) Business law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204.

Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669.

Stevenson, Jacques & Co v McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346.